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Uncertainty and absence of arbitrage
opportunity
Y. Ivanenko ∗, I. Pasichnichenko †
Abstract
It is shown that absence of arbitrage opportunity in financial mar-
kets is a particular case of existence of uncertainty in decision system.
Absence of arbitrage opportunity is considered in the sense of the
Arrow-Debreu model of financial market with a riskless asset, while
uncertainty (or ambiguity) is defined on the basis of the principle of
internal coherence of M. Allais.
Key words Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Arbitrage opportunity, Decision
system
1 Introduction
The notion of uncertainty as of something opposite to risk was proposed by
Frank Knight [1]. The presence or availability of probability distribution
on the set of consequences or on the set of states of Nature was considered
as risk, while the absence or unavailability of such probability distribution
was considered as uncertainty. This paradigm considerably influenced the
consequent development of the so called descriptive decision theory [3, 5].
So decision theories, explaining the Ellsberg paradox, essentially recurred to
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the definition of uncertainty proposed by Knight and often used the words
ambiguity and uncertainty as synonyms [4, 8].
There exist, however, several arguments in favour of an alternative view
on the problem of formalisation of the notion of uncertainty or ambiguity.
One of such arguments is the possibility to define these notions solely on
the basis of what Maurice Allais called "the principle of internal coherence
employed in social sciences"1. Assuming, following Allais, that rationality
implies that decisions are made for the sake of achieving goals (see [2], p.504),
one can define uncertainty as existence of several preference relations on the
set of decisions (acts) when the preference relation on consequences is fixed
[9, 10]. 2 It can be shown, that existence of at least one pair of acts on which
the preference relation is not unique is already necessary and sufficient for
existence of uncertainty.
It turns out that the stronger requirement, that uncertainty, thus defined,
exists for any pair of acts is analogical to the notion of absence of arbitrage
opportunity used in mathematical finance [13, 14, 15]. This means that the
notion of absence of arbitrage opportunity is the particular case of existence
of uncertainty. Therefore one can consider many subjects that traditionally
have been considered as specific exclusively to financial theory, in general,
and mathematical finance, in particular, from the vantage point of decision
theory, and remaining strictly within its borders. 3
Note, that decision theory based on this definition of uncertainty leads
to the following distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk becomes the
1«The principle of internal consistency implies only: (a) the use of objective probabil-
ities when they exist, and (b) the axiom of absolute preference which states that out of
two situations, one is certainly preferable if, for all possible outcomes, it yields a greater
gain.»([2], p.504).
2In other words, the person knows what does she want, but does not know which way
to choose in order to achieve that.
3Note that the notion of arbitrage decision in game theory is opposite to the one
employed in finance. Recall that in game theory a decision is called the arbitrage decision
if it satisfies all players [17, 18], while in financial theory, when speaking about arbitrage
opportunity, it is always understood as satisfaction of interests of only one person.
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property of one decision, meaning solely the multiplicity of consequences of
the decision, without any relation to whether or not there is a probability
distribution. Uncertainty (or ambiguity) is the property of decision situa-
tion, that is when there are many decisions, each of which may have many
consequences [10]. That is, uncertainty can exist there where previously (ac-
cording to Knight) there could be only risk. Moreover, in this formulation
the notion of uncertainty (or ambiguity) makes sense only relatively to the
goals of decision maker, described by her preference relation on the set of
consequences. 4 That is why it makes sense to consider the approach to
formalisation of the notion of uncertainty (or ambiguity) proposed here as
normative [5] or operational.
The article is organised in the following way. In Section 2 the definition
and the criterion of existence of uncertainty in decision situation are intro-
duced. Note that the notions of uncertainty and ambiguity are understood
as synonyms. In Section 3 it is shown that, on the one hand, the absence of
arbitrage opportunity on financial markets is a particular case of existence
of uncertainty in decision situation, and, on the other hand, it is possible
to extend the notion of arbitrage opportunity from financial markets to the
general decision situation. Thus Section 3 can be considered as a concrete,
though theoretical, example of the abstract framework of Section 2.
2 Uncertainty
Pursuing the examination of conditions of existence of uncertainty, initiated
in [9, 10], consider the problem of formal description of the class of decision
making situations, where the preference of the individuum relatively to con-
sequences does not "completely define" her preferences relatively to decisions
(acts). In other words, consider such situations where preference relation on
4Remark, that this approach to risk and uncertainty is in line with the notion of
coherent uncertainty measures [7, 6, 10].
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consequences is compatible with several preference relations on acts at the
same time. We need to refine the intuitive understanding of how preferences
on consequences can define preferences on acts. This refinement may have
the form of the condition imposed on the relation between the two preference
relations. This condition should be weak enough in order to span the largest
class of possible behavior. This article employs the condition of domina-
tion, which is necessary in order to formalize mathematically the principle of
internal consistency mentioned above.
Due to terminological discrepancies in contemporary literature, let us
recall here properties of the binary relations that are used in this article. Let
X be an arbitrary set.
Definition 1. Relation (≺, X) is called preference relation if it is:
1) assymetric: x ≺ y ⇒ not y ≺ x for all x, y ∈ X;
2) negatively transitive: not x ≺ y, not y ≺ z ⇒ not x ≺ z for all
x, y, z ∈ X.
Thus the preference relation is the irreflexive version of a common weak
order. Having defined the preference relation one can define the indifference
relation in the usual way, assuming
x ∼ y ⇔ ( not x ≺ y and not y ≺ x) for all x, y ∈ X
That indifference relation is equivalence is straightforward.
Definition 2. Relation (≺, X) is called strict partial order if it is:
1) irreflexive: not x ≺ x for all x ∈ X;
2) transitive: x ≺ y, y ≺ z ⇒ x ≺ z for all x, y, z ∈ X.
If the strict partial order is, besides,
3) connected: x 6= y ⇒ x ≺ y or y ≺ x for all x, y ∈ X,
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then it is called strict linear order. 5
Preference relation on the set of consequences reflects their desirability to
the decision maker or, in other words, her interests. Consider, for simplicity,
as consequences real numbers with their natural order < as the preference
relation (see footnote 2). Here, for real numbers, the only meaningful oper-
ation is their comparison in value. This identification of consequences with
real numbers fits all the cases where the conditions of the theorem of existence
of utility function are satisfied (see, for instance, [11], p.27). It is clear, how-
ever, that one and the same real life situation with consequences of arbitrary
nature may have for different persons the form of different situations with
numeric consequences, depending on personal preferences of consequences.
Definition 3. A pair (Θ, D), where D is some set of real functions on the
set Θ, is called a matrix decision scheme (matrix scheme), D is called the
set of acts (decisions), Θ is the set of values of some parameter θ.
The set of acts contains the acts available in the decision situation. The
consequences of each of these acts are, in the general case, not unique, which
is described by means of dependence of consequences, i.e. values of functions
from the set D, on the parameter θ ∈ Θ, usually called the state of Nature
[3]. The matrix scheme does not contain any complementary information
about the regularity of appearance of consequences. For instance, it does not
contain a probability distribution on the set Θ. That is why such pairs of
sets are called "schemes".6
5Strict linear order is a preference relation as well.
6It is worth noticing that a matrix decision scheme thus defined is a combination of
the usual Savage decision-theoretical structure, consisting of the set of acts, A, of the set
of states of Nature, Θ, of the set of consequences, C, of the mapping g : A×Θ→ C, and
of the utility function on consequences, u : C → R. That is in terms of [9, 10] we are
dealing here with the pair (Zm, βC), Zm = (Θ, A, C, g), where the preference relation of
consequences βC is represented by some utility function u(g(θ, a)).
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Definition 4. A relation (≺, D) defined on the set of acts is called domi-
nation if for any d1, d2 ∈ D
d1 ≺ d2 ⇔ [d1(θ) ≤ d2(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ and d1(θ
∗) < d2(θ
∗) for some θ∗ ∈ Θ]
Apparently, domination is a strict partial order. We are interested here
only in those preference relations on the set of acts that are compatible with
domination in the sense of the following definition.
Definition 5. The preference relation (≺P , D) defined on the set of acts of
the matrix scheme (Θ, D) is called a projection of preference of consequences
in the scheme (Θ, D) (or just a projection), if
d1 ≺ d2 ⇒ d1 ≺
P d2 for any d1, d2 ∈ D, (1)
where (≺, D) is domination.
Definition 6. A matrix scheme (Θ, D) contains uncertainty if the projection
of preference of consequences is not unique.
Thus, definition 6 divides matrix decision schemes and, correspondingly,
decision situations, on two classes: containing and not containing uncertainty.
The next theorem answers divers questions relatively to uniqueness of the
projection and, correspondingly, the question of existence of uncertainty in
decision scheme.
Theorem 1. In any matrix scheme
1) there exist a projection of preference of consequences;
2) projection of preference of consequences is unique if and only if domi-
nation is connected;
3) uniqueness of projection of preference of consequences implies its iden-
tity with domination.
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Proof. Let (Θ, D) be an arbitrary matrix scheme.
1) Existence of projection follows imediatley from Szpilrajn extension theo-
rem (see, for instance, [11], p.31), according to which any strict partial order
can be extended to strict linear order. Applying this theorem to domination
(≺, D), we obtain a strict linear order (≺P , D) such that
d1 ≺ d2 ⇒ d1 ≺
P d2 for any d1, d2 ∈ D, (2)
guaranteeing largely fulfillement of the conditions of definition 5.7
2) Sufficiency. If domination is connected, then it is a preference rela-
tion and, hence, a projection of preference of consequences. Assume there is
a projection (≺P , D) different from domination. That is assume there exist
such d1, d2 ∈ D that, d1 ≺
P d2 and not d1 ≺ d2. But due to connectedness of
domination, from ( not d1 ≺ d2) follows that either d1 = d2, or d2 ≺ d1. In
the second case, condition (1) implies d2 ≺
P d1. So, in both cases assymetry
of projection gives contradiction with the initial assumption that d1 ≺
P d2.
Necessity. Assume that domination is not connected and construct two
different projections. Let none of the relations d1 = d2, d1 ≺ d2, d2 ≺ d1 is
fulfilled for some d1, d2 ∈ D. Construct the projetion (≺
P
1
, D) as described
above in section 1 of the proof. Such projection, moreover, will be a strict
linear order. Therefore, it implies either d1 ≺
P
1
d2 or d2 ≺
P
1
d1. Let, for
instance, the first case takes place. Construct now the projection (≺P
2
, D),
for which d2 ≺
P
2
d1 holds. For the sake of this construction extend the
domination (≺, D) in a suitable way to (≺
′
, D), assuming for any x, y ∈ D,
that
x ≺
′
y ⇔ x ≺ y or [(x ≺ d2 or x = d2) and (d1 ≺ y or y = d1)] . (3)
7A projection should be a preference relation, not necessarily a strict linear order.
7
It is clear that d2 ≺
′
d1 and
x ≺ y ⇒ x ≺′ y for any x, y ∈ D. (4)
It can be shown by sorting out all the possibilities in the right hand side
of (3), that (≺′, D) is a strict partial order. Now repeat the reasonings of
the section 1 of the proof for (≺′, D) instead of (≺, D) and obtain the strict
linear order (≺P
2
) with d2 ≺
P
2
d1. Condition (1) is fulfilled due to (4) and (2).
Hence we obtained the projection different from the previous one.
The statement 3 of the theorem follows immediately from the statement
2, since connectedness of domination turns this relation from strict partial
order into strict linear order and, hence, into a projection of preference of
consequences.
In definition 6 we try to convey intuitive ideas about existence of uncer-
tainty in matrix decision scheme. At the same time, statement 2 of theorem
1 indicates how one can simplify the formal usage of this notion. This is done
in the next proposition, providing the criterion of existence of uncertainty in
matrix scheme.
Corollary 1. Matrix scheme (Θ, D) contains uncertainty if and only if there
are such d1, d2 ∈ D and such θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ, that d1(θ) < d2(θ) and d2(θ
′) < d1(θ
′).
Proof. By definition, the matrix scheme contains uncertainty if and only if
the projection of preference of consequences is not unique. According to
statement 2 of theorem 1, this is equivalent to non connectedness of domi-
nation. That is, there are such distinct d1, d2 ∈ D that neither d2 ≺ d1, nor
d1 ≺ d2 is true. This, in its own turn, by definition of domination, is equiva-
lent to existence of such θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, that d1(θ) < d2(θ) and d2(θ
′) < d1(θ
′).
Hence, even if a decision making situation contains only two states of
Nature, there are two decisions, the consequences of which so depend on the
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states of Nature, that the matrix scheme contains uncertainty. The following
figures 1 and 2 illustrate these results.
Figure 1: An illustration of the situation with uncertainty.
Note that this approach to formalisation of the notion of uncertainty is
in logical correspondence with Allais’s principle of internal consistency, cited
above. Namely, if projection is unique, then the act that dominates another
act in all states is always preferable.
3 Absence of arbitrage opportunity
The notion of uncertainty in matrix scheme finds its immediate application
in finance. It turns out that the notion of absence of arbitrage opportunity
on the financial market can be considered as an example of existence of
uncertainty in matrix decision scheme.
In the case of financial decision making situations, the convention related
to numeric valuation of consequences does not play any role, since the initial
9
Figure 2: An illustration of the situation without uncertainty.
situation contains only monetary consequences. We can assume that all de-
cision makers prefer higher monetary sums to lower. By the same token, we
assume that monetary sums play the role of the utility or, in other words,
the values of the utility function on consequences coincide, in this case, with
consequences themselves. This fact, in particular, will allow us considering fi-
nancial decision schemes as examples of the matrix decision scheme presented
in the previous section.
Recur to the following formal description of the financial market, related
to the Arrow-Debreu model of securities market [13, 14, 15].
Definition 7. A pair (A, p), A ∈ Rn×m, p ∈ Rn is called financial market
with a riskless asset, if A1j = 1 for any j ∈ {1, . . . , m} and p1 ≤ 1.
The elements of the set Θ = {1, . . . , m} are called the states of the market.
The matrix A contains cash-flows of each of the n securities for all states of
the market. So that A = [a1 a2 . . . am], where aθ = [a1θ a2θ . . . anθ]
T ∈ Rn,
contains securities cash-flows in the state θ. The vector p ∈ Rn consists of
10
prices of the securities. Without loss of generality one can consider p1 = 1.
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A portfolio is a vector x ∈ Rn and the components of its aggregate cash-flow
in each state are the elements of ATx ∈ R.
Definition 8. Portfolio x ∈ Rn is called an arbitrage portfolio on the market
(A, p) if either (pTx ≤ 0 and ATx > 0) or (pTx < 0 and ATx ≥ 0).
Usually (see, for instance, [14, 15]) this definition is followed by The
Arbitrage Theorem, stating that the market does not contain an arbitrage
portfolio if and only if there is a vector ψ ∈ Rn with positive components,
called state prices, such that p = Aψ. However, this theorem is not the object
of attention in this article, since our goal here is establishing of the relation
between the notion of absence of arbitrage opportunity and the notion of
existence of uncertainty in matrix scheme.
Represent the financial market (A, p) in terms of the matrix scheme
(Θ, D), where Θ = {1, 2, . . . , m}. Define the matrices B = A−[p p . . . p] , B ∈
R
n×m. The set of acts D =
{
BTx : x ∈ Rn
}
, D ⊂ Rm consists of all vectors
of profits available on the market. The components of each such vector are
profits of the portfolio x in the corresponding state. Such matrix scheme
(Θ, D) is called corresponding to the market (A, p). 9
Lemma 1. The market (A, p) contains arbitrage portfolio if and only if the
corresponding matrix scheme (Θ, D) contains a decision d ∈ D such that
d > 0.10
Proof. From definition 8, for an arbitrage portfolio x, in both cases, we have
aTθ x − p
Tx ≥ 0 for any θ ∈ Θ and aTθ∗x − p
Tx > 0 for some θ∗ ∈ Θ. Hence
8Note that the riskless interest rate is equal to 1−p1
p1
. If p1 < 1 then one can discount
initial prices with the discount factor 1 + 1−p1
p1
= 1
p1
.
9In the terms of Savagian decision-theoretical structure we deal here with the following
matrix scheme: the set of states of Nature, Θ = {1, . . . ,m}, the set of acts X = Rn,
the set of consequences, C = R, the mapping g : Θ × X → C, such that g(θ, x) =∑n
i=1(aiθ − pi)xi, g(·, ·) ∈ C and the utility function u(g(θ, x)) = g(θ, x), x ∈ X, θ ∈ Θ.
10Here and in what follows we use the following conventional notation: for two vectors
x, y ∈ Rn, x ≤ y means xi ≤ yi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n and x < y means (x ≤ y and x 6= y)..
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the act d = BTx satisfies condition d > 0. And vice versa, if there is
d > 0, d ∈ D, then for some portfolio x we have BTx = d > 0. Define x¯ ∈ Rn
as x¯T = xT −
[
pTx 0 0 . . . 0
]
, then
AT x¯ = AT


x−


pTx
0
...
0




= ATx−


pTx
pTx
...
pTx


= BTx > 0, (5)
and pT x¯ = pTx − pTx = 0. Hence, portfolio x¯ is an arbitrage portfolio
according to the first condition of definition 8. Note that portfolio x¯ is just
the leveraged version of the portfolio x. The lemma is proved.
Hence the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The market (A, p) does not contain an arbitrage portfolio if
and only if for the corresponding matrix scheme (Θ, D) and for any D′ ⊆ D
such that |D′| ≥ 2, the matrix scheme (Θ, D′) contains uncertainty.
Proof. For convenience, let us operate with negations of the statements, log-
ical equivalence of which is the object of the theorem. Note that for vectors,
the relation of domination from definition 4 is identical to (<,D) (see foot-
note 10). If market (A, p) contains an arbitrage portfolio, then according to
the previous lemma 0 < d for some d ∈ D. Then {d, 0} ⊆ D and the matrix
scheme (Θ, {d, 0}) does not contain uncertainty, since there is only one pro-
jection of preference of consequences (≺P , D). Namely, for any x, y ∈ {d, 0},
x ≺P y if and only if x = 0, y = d. Conversely, if for some D′ ⊆ D, |D′| ≥ 2,
the matrix scheme (Θ, D′) does not contain uncertainty, then, according to
statement 2 of theorem 1, domination in this scheme is connected, and it is
possible to chose different d1, d2 ∈ D
′ such that, for instance, d1 < d2. If
d1 = B
Tx1 and d2 = B
Tx2, where x1, x2 ∈ R
n, then d¯ = BT (x2 − x1) ∈ D
and d¯ > 0, which, according to the lemma, implies existence of arbitrage
portfolio.
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It is possible to relax the condition of absence of arbitrage opportunity on
the financial market, considering portfolio x as arbitrage portfolio only when
(pTx < 0 and ATx ≥ 0). Such market sometimes is called weakly arbitrage-
free [15]. For such definition of the arbitrage portfolio the statement similar
to theorem 2 is obtained if in the definition of projection of preference of
consequences in matrix scheme the relation of domination is replaced by its
enforced version: for any d1, d2 ∈ D
d1 ≺
∗ d2 ⇔ d1(θ) < d2(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. (6)
So theorem 2 states that absence of arbitrage opportunity in the financial
market is equivalent to existence of uncertainty in any matrix scheme ob-
tained by restriction of the decision set of the matrix scheme corresponding
to that market. In other words, this is the case when uncertainty does not
disappear from the matrix scheme in the result of deleting of or forbidding
some acts. If the market contains arbitrage portfolio, then there is a set
of acts (portfolios) that forms the matrix scheme which does not contain
uncertainty.
Thus, theorem 2 allows considering one of the fundamental notions of
financial theory without leaving the precincts of decision theory and, at the
same time, without recurring to the notion of risk attitude of decision maker.
This is all the more significant since it renders financial theory a particular
case or, better, an example of decision theory, the idea usually disregarded.
11.
On the other hand, taking definition 6 and theorem 2, one can extend
the notion of arbitrage opportunity from financial markets to any decision
making situation. Namely, one can say that any matrix scheme, that does
not satisfy the conditions of theorem 2, contains an arbitrage opportunity.
11For instance, in [16] one reads: "The option pricing formula of Black and Scholes
(1973) is valid without regard to the risk preferences of investors, because it is based
solely on the absence of arbitrage opportunities."
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In other words, the notion of arbitrage acquires the meaning of the univalent
projecting of the preference of consequences onto the preference of acts. The
opportunity of arbitrage means the possibility of such univalent projecting
for some pair of acts in the scheme.
4 Conclusions
Thus, this paper gives definition of the notion of uncertainty in matrix de-
cision scheme and provides the criterion of its existence. This formalisation
of the notion of uncertainty is a farther development of the corresponding
definition and theorem, proposed in [9, 10] for the lottery decision scheme.
Together these results comprise an alternative to Knightian approach to the
problem of formalisation of the notion of uncertainty. At the same time, this
alternative formulation corresponds to the principle of internal consistency
of M. Allais.
It turns out that this approach to the notion of uncertainty in decision
scheme is related to the notion of arbitrage opportunity on financial markets.
It is shown that, on the one hand, absence of arbitrage opportunity (i.e.
absence of arbitrage portfolio) on the financial market is a particular case
of existence of uncertainty in matrix scheme, and, on the other hand, it is
possible to extend the notion of arbitrage opportunity on any, not necessarily
financial, decision making situation.
5 Aknowlegements
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